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UNIFORMITY OF LAW AND ITS PRACTICAL
APPLICATION IN THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS ACT
DEAN MARSHALL MCKUSICK*
D URING the last quarter of a century there has been an earnest and
persistent effort on the part of the legal profession to simplify and
unify Americati jurisprudence. This effort has resulted in codifying
many branches of the law both substantive and adjective, and in pre-
senting such codifications to the legislatures of the several states and
territories for adoption, hoping thereby to ultimately assimilate a body
of law which shall be recognized by all states alike; this iridescent legal
Utopia is much like that proposed by Bentham and his followers, one
in which everyone should readily know the law or be able to quickly
find it by turning to a code, and in which the professional lawyer would
be abolished; such an idealistic dream vanishes like the mists of the
early morning under the influence of the rising sun, for we know that
what is right at one time and place is not necessarily universal truth;
that "so long as the skein of human affairs is full of difficult tangles the
law controlling those affairs cannot be simple or easily understood by
uninstructed persons; that much of our law is in too vague a form to
be written down; that new cases may arise tomorrow for which the
common law will find an answer though neither the question nor the
answer could be suggested by the one who framed a code to-day."' The
situation is tersely summarized by Dean Roscoe Pound, when he says,
"Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still." The vice of law
uniformity is most excellently stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo of the
New York Court of Appeals as follows: "Better that they (lawyers and
* Dean of School of Law.
University of South Dakota.
'From an address delivered by Professor Williston before the Law Associa-
tion of Philadelphia, December i8, 1914.
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judges) should stray as they are straying in the wilderness of precedents
with all the snares and entanglements of dicta, than that they should
lose the divine impulse to move onward and upward in the slow and
toilsome process of renewing the foundations and the structure of jus-
tice upon Earth."
The great bulk of the work in preparing and initiating uniform laws
has been born by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the
American Bar Association. There have been in all thirty-two uniform
acts drafted and approved by the Conference. Wisconsin leads the
other states in the number of uniform acts passed by the legislature,
twenty in all. 2 Tennessee is in second place with seventeen, sharing this
honor with Louisiana." The Negotiable Instruments Act has been
adopted in fifty-one states and territories. Georgia is the only state
that has not adopted the act. The act provides one standard for
negotiable instruments as to their form or requisites of negotiability,
and it provides a uniform rule as to methods of their transfer. When
it is taken into consideration that ninety per cent of all interstate com-
merce is taken care of through the medium of some form of negotiable
paper, it becomes immediately apparent that uniformity of law is neces-
sary in order that commercial enterprises may be free from embarrass-
ments resulting from a diversity of law in the several states in regard to
the requisites and negotiability of bills, notes and checks. As expressed
by Mr. Justice Winslow, "The purpose of the law is not to make radical
changes in long established and fundamental principles, but to wipe out
the many differences in minor details existing among the laws of the
various states by adopting in each case that rule which was best adapted
to the needs of the business world.;"4 "It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that the Negotiable Instruments Act was drafted for the purpose
of codifying the law upon the subject of negotiable instruments and
making it uniform throughout the country through adoption by the
legislatures of the several states and by the Congress of the United
States. The design was to obliterate state lines as to the law governing
'Bills of Lading Act (9,7); Cold Storage Act (917); Conditional Sales
Act (1gig); Desertion and Non-Support Act (1911); Extradition of Persons
of Unsound Mind Act (igig); Flag Act (1919); Foreign Acknowledgments
Act (1915) ; Foreign Probated Wills Act (9,5) ; Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(igig) Limited Partnership Act (1gig) ; Marriage and Marriage License Act
(1917); Marriage Evasion Act (i9i5) : Migratory Divorce Act (19oi) ; Divorce
Procedure Act (igoi) ; Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act (i9O9) ; Sales
Act (1911) ; Stock Transfer Act (1913) ; Warehouse Receipts Act (igog).
*Reports of American Bar Association, Volume 48 (1923) 69g.
'State Bank v. Michel, 152 Wis. 88, 139 N.W. 748, rehearing denied, 152
Wis. 96, 139 N.W. 1131.
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instrumentalities so vital to the conduct of interstate commerce as prom-
issory notes and bills of exchange, to remove the confusion or un-
certainty which might arise from conflict of statutes or judicial decisions
amongst the several states, and to make plain, certain and general the
controlling rules of law. Diversity was to be molded into uniformity."'
In the United States there was, prior to the drafting of the Negoti-
able Instruments Law, a codification of the law of bills, notes and
checks in some states. The earliest codification of this law is found in
the California Code of 1872. A number of other states, including North
and South Dakota, codify this law along practically identical lines.
In England the uniform bills of exchange act was passed in 1882 and
has operated successfully ever since. It has been adopted by over two-
thirds of the total number of the various colonies and dependencies of
the British Empire.
The German Code on Negotiable Paper, called the German General
Exchange Law, was adopted in 1849, was slightly modified in 1869 and
has been in practical operation ever since in all the German states. The
French Code was adopted over a century ago and has followed sub-
stantially ever since.
"The evils of diversity of law, which have afflicted France and Ger-
many may in some respects have been worse than those which we find
in United States. Whatever our differences of law may be, the main
stream is with slight exception the same-the common law of England,
which is the source of all our laws, excepting the slight infusion of civil
law, which still persists in the territory obtained by the Louisiana Pur-
chase and The Mexican War."6
The first step taken toward uniform legislation with regard to nego-
tiable instruments dates back to the year 1895 when a conference of
commissioners from nineteen states was held and a resolution adopted
requesting the committee on commercial law to procure the draft of
the bill relating to commercial paper, based on the English bills of
exchange act and such other sources of information as the committees
might deem proper to consult; and to prepare a codification of the law
relating to bills, notes and checks. The matter was referred to a sub-
committee consisting of Lyman B. Brewster of Connecticut, Henry C.
Wilson of New York, and Frank Bergen of New Jersey. Mr. John J.
Crawford was employed by the sub-committee to draft the proposed
law; it is important to note that the committee in drafting the law fol-
'Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 2o5, 98 N.E. 679, Ann. Cas. 913 C
5z5, quoted in the Graham v. Shepherd, 136 Tenn. 418, I89 S.W. 867 Ann. Cas.
x918 E. 8o4.
'63 U. of Penn. L.R. 20o.
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lowed the decisions of the federal courts wherever the laws of the state
courts were in conflict. When completed, the draft was printed and a
copy sent to each member of the conference, also to many prominent
lawyers and law professors, and judges of the English Bench asking
them to offer suggestions as to changes or additions to the proposed
law. The draft was submitted to the conference at Saratoga, New York,
in 1896. The commissioners in attendance were twenty-seven in num-
ber and represented fourteen states. The proposed law was gone over
section by section, and amendments were made thereto. The finished
product was recommended for enactment by the state legislatures and
approved by the American Bar Association.7
There are a number of obstacles to be met in securing uniformity of
law : first, the inexpert drafting of statutes, second, the leaning of courts
towards the decision of legal points in a controversy in the light of
case precedent irrespective of statute law, third, judicial legislation, and
fourth, local conditions.
First, the inexpert drafting of statutes. In prefacing the first ob-
stacle to uniformity of law may I suggest that a large share of the
responsibility for the draftmanship of a statute rests upon the lawyers,
who are members of the legislatures. In regard to those statutes which
modify in effect, the common law, almost the entire responsibility for
the draftsmanship, both as to substance and form, rests upon the law-
yers in the legislatures. If such a statute miscarries by reason of want
of knowledge of the common law, or want of art in drafting a
statute, the blame falls principally upon the lawyers. An authority
upon statutory construction has said, "the quality of the statutes in each
state is not a bad index to the average quality of the bar in that state."
Whether this statement is correct or not is not material to this paper.
The fact remains, however, that to draw a statute modifying the common
law in such language as to effect the result intended is one of the most
difficult achievements of legal skill. Instances of such statutes, ancient
and modem, might be cited to corroborate this statement. The statute
of uses passed by Parliament in 1535 was intended to abolish uses; it
resulted in placing uses on a much firmer foundation than before. In-
expertness in drafting the statute was not the only cause of this result;
judicial legislation assisted materially. ,
When the Negotiable Instruments Act was adopted in Wisconsin in
1899 some alterations were made and among others a sub-section to
section 120 of the original act.
An interesting commentary upon the Negotiable Intruments Law as a result
of the Ames-Brewster controversy is found in a review by Professor Joseph
Brannan in his text on the Negotiable Instruments Law. (Third Edition) 418.
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Section 120 reads as follows:
"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:
"(i) By any act which discharges the instrument.
"(2) By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder.
"(3) By the discharge of a prior party.
"(4) By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party.
"(5) By a release of the principal debtor unless the holder's right
of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved.
"(6) By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time
of payment or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument,
unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved."
The sub-section added by the Wisconsin Legislature was as follows:
"By giving up or applying to other purposes collateral security ap-
plicable to the debt, or, there being in the holder's hands or within his
control, the means of complete or partial satisfaction, the same are
applied to other purposes."
Clearly, this sub-section was either not properly drafted or was in-
tended to change the existing law already decided by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin.8 Mr. Justice Winslow, in referring to the Plankinton
Case, says: "It seems to be demonstrated that the new sub-section was
based upon this decision, by the fact that the syllabus of the Plankinton
case is quoted in full in the note to the entire section under the heading,
'Releasing Security.' It is equally clear that there was no intention to
change the law as laid down in Plankinton v. Gorman but rather an in-
tention to incorporate the principle of that case in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, because no mention is made in the note of any change
in the law of Wisconsin, and it is quite plain that the Plankinton Case
is cited as the basis upon which sub-section '4A' rests." Granted that
this is true, nevertheless, the language of the sub-section does not ex-
press that result. Mr. justice Barnes in the dissenting opinion says,
"The statute under consideration seems to me to be as plain as the
English language can make it ..... .If the creditor applies collateral
security to other purposes than the payment of the debt which it was
given to secure, the surety is discharged. I do not see how this pro-
vision can be read to mean a partial discharge only, when the value of
the collateral surrendered or misapplied is less than the debt which it
was given to secure. If the legislature had so intended, it would have
said so. The second contingency provided for, even more dearly if
possible, shows that the legislature intended what it said-a discharge-
which obviously means nothing short of a complete discharge. This
provision is to the effect that where there is in the creditor's hands or
sPlankizton v. Gornian, 93 Wis. 560, 67 N.W. 1128. (June 1896).
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under his control the 'means of complete or partial satisfaction,' and he
fails to make the proper application of them, the person secondarily
liable is discharged. The same results follow whether the property is
partially or entirely sufficient to pay the debt. In either case there is
a discharge. I think it is unfair to the legislature to say that it had the
intent found by the court. To do so is to convict it of being extremely
careless in the use of language in enacting an important statute. At
best we have another case of 'hindsight' being better than 'foresight.'
If the matter had been called to the legislature it might have provided
for pro tanto discharges only, in proper cases, and then again it might
not. It would not be difficult to express such an intention so that it
could be easily understood. Not having done so one of two things is ap-
parent: either the legislature did not think of partial discharges or else
it did not intend to provide for them. If the first 'horn of dilemma' is
correct, the legislature should remedy the defect; and if the second is cor-
rect, there is nothing to remedy." The Supreme Court in the majority
opinion in this case corrected the error-if there was one-but in doing
so exercised the function of the legislature. The writer has used this illus-
tration at length to show the possibility of error in drafting a statute.
Second, the leaning of courts toward the decision of legal points is a
controversy in the'light of case precedent irrespective of statute. The
present era of our jurisprudence is one of case law, the lawyer having
obtained the facts in his case, examines the statutes of his state to
determine the legal status of the controversy. If, perchance, there is no
statute in point, he begins a search for authority involving the common
law principles of his case, and the courts of last resort, in turn, exert
themselves to explain their decisions on the bases of other cases handed
down either by the courts of that state or of other states that may have
decided the question of law at issue. The Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act is framed in such language for the most part, that resort to
legal precedent is unnecessary. The language of the court in Columbian
Banking Co. v. Bowen9 expresses in no uncertain terms the plain duty
of the courts under a uniform statute law: "such a statute (referring to
the Negotiable Instruments Law) was enacted for the purpose of fur-
nishing in itself a certain guide for the determination of all questions
covered thereby relating to commercial paper, and therefore, so far as it
speaks without ambiguity as to any such questions, reference to case
law as it existed prior to the enactment is unnecessary and is liable to
be misleading. The Negotiable Instruments Law is not-merely a legis-
lative codification of judicial rules previously existing in this state,
making that written law which was before unwritten. It is, so far as
134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451.
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it goes, an incorporation into written law of the common law of the
state, so to speak-the law merchant generally as recognized here-
with such changes or modifications and additions as to make a system
harmonizing, so far as practicable with that prevailing in other states."' 0
The disposition of some courts to follow prior decisions in their own
states rather than the explicit provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
Act will in time decrease the efficiency of any uniform law and render
chaotic, legislation which was intended to simplify and clarify law which
was previously uncertain and confused. Chief justice Rugg, in Union
Trust Company v. McGinty," gives an excellent exposition of law uni-
formity as follows: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the
Negotiable Instruments Act was drafted for the purpose of codifying
the law upon the subject of Negotiable Instruments and making it uni-
form throughout the country through adoption by the legislatures of
the several states and by the Congress of the United States. The design
was to obliterate state lines as to the law governing instrumentalities
so vital to the conduct of interstate commerce, as promissory notes and
bills of exchange, to remove the confusion or uncertainty which might
arise from conflict of statutes or judicial decisions amongst the several
states, and to make plain, certain and general the controlling rules of
law. Diversity was to be molded into uniformity. This act in sub-
stance has been adopted by many states. While it does not cover the
whole field of negotiable instrument law, it is decisive as to all matters
comprehended within its terms. It ought to be interpreted in such a
way as to give effect to the beneficent design of the legislature in passing
an act for the promotion of harmony upon an important branch of the
law. Simplicity and clearness are ends especially to be sought. The
language of the act is to be construed with reference to the object to
be attained. Its words are to be given their natural and common mean-
ing, and the prevailing principles of statutory interpretation are to be
employed. Care should be taken to adhere as closely as possible to the
obvious meaning of the act, without resort to that which had theretofore
been the law of this Commonwealth, unless necessary to dissolve ob-
scurity or doubt, especially in instances where there was a difference
in the law in the different states."
Some of the courts have followed an unfortunate and ill-advised ten-
dency in their construction of several sections of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act. The courts of New York-which was the first state to
" The act supercedes all pre-existing contradictory laws, rules and adjudica-
tions. Ingalls v. Marston, 12r Maine 182, i6 Atl. 216; Okla. State Bank v.
Seaton,-Okla.--70 Pac. 477; Shawano First Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 139 Wis. 126,
12o N.W. 82o, 131 American State Rep. 1040.
n 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 525.
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adopt the act--offer a conspicuous example of the possible damage that
may be done law uniformity. Let us take Section (25)12 of the act as
a concrete illustration; this section reads as follows:
"Consideration. What constitutes the value of any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract? An antecedent or pre-existing
debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is
payable on demand or at some future time." This section, it was sup-
posed, would settle for all time the perplexing question as to whether a
person was a holder for value of a promissory note or bill of exchange
taken in payment of, or as collateral security for an antecedent or pre-
existing debt. The "New York rule," which had its inception in 1822
in the case of Coddington v. Bay,13 held that a pre-existing or antecedent
indebtedness did not constitute value for the purpose of establishing
bona fide ownership of negotiable paper. A number of cases involving
this issue have been decided by New York courts since the Negotiable
Instruments Act was passed. In only a few of the cases was the
Negotiable Instruments Act mentioned and the old case of Coddington
v. Bay was frequently referred to as the law of that state. The first
decision of any of the state courts to construe Section 51 was Brewster v.
Shrader.4 A part of the language of this decision by Mr. Justice
Werner follows. The court said, "The language of this section when
given its usual and ordinary signification ought to leave no room for
doubt upon the subject. There is, however, such a universal disposition
among lawyers to look for some hidden or subtle meaning in the most
simple language, that it has become quite the fashion for the courts to
construe statutes, which, to the average lay mind, seem to require no
construction. If the language of this section was not obviously clear
and unequivocal and there was need of ascertaining the legislative intent
in order to give proper effect to such language, the history of the sub-
ject, of the judicial decisions in England and the states of this country,
and of the proceedings of the commission on uniformity of laws, leave
no possible doubt as to the purpose of this section. James W. Eaton,
who was at the time instructor in the Law of Bills and Notes in the
Albany Law School, in his published edition of the New York Negoti-
able Instruments Act in a note to Section 51, says: "It is to be inferred
that the above section extends the New York law to include instruments
given merely as collateral security." Mr. Justice Werner in the Brew-
ster case gives a very scholarly exposition of the law of this section
and it would seem that the matter had been settled, but in 1903 in the
'Section 5I of the Negotiable Instruments Act of New York.
2o Johns. 637.
"26 Misc. (1899).
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case of Sutherland v. Mead,15 the court of five judges unanimously over-
ruled the decision in Brewster v. Shrader and returned to the New York
rule in Coddington v. Bay. This is all the more extraordinary in view
of the fact that in 1903 decisions of other states had passed upon
Section 51 and concurred with Brewster v. Shrader; it is strange, too,
that none of these decisions were even referred to.
Without an analysis of all the New York cases-for the scope of this
paper will not permit-it appears that the judiciary of New York, up
to the time of the decision of Kelso v. Ellis,6 lacked the true juristic
conception of the law in Section 51 and tenaciously clung to a decision
obviously in conflict therewith. Satisfied with that principle asserted
over a century ago, they failed to recognize the necessity of examining
the subject anew in the light of the uniform act of 1897. Nor did they
deign to notice the decisions of courts of last resort decided under this
section. The decisions of other states in construing this section of the
act, for the most part, do not hesitate to apply the law in its natural
meaning, even though to do so is to overrule some pet theory adopted
by their courts for many years. And why not? What is the use of a
uniform law unless we can have uniform decisions thereunder? And
how are uniform decisions to be reached except by recognizing the
decisions of other states under the same law?
Third, judicial legislation. It has already been pointed out in an early
part of this article, that courts have been known to supply by judicial
legislation deficiencies, so called, in a statute because of inadvertence or
careless draftsmanship by the framers of the statute. State Bank v.
Michel (Supra). Whether this is legally justifiable is a matter about
which there seems to be a difference of opinion among laymen and even
members of the Bar. But at all events this practice is a serious menace
to the achievement of uniform law. A case was decided in Iowa17 not
long since in which the question at issue involved the liability of an
endorser of a non-negotiable instrument. The court, after stating the
law applicable to the endorser of a non-negotiable instrument and that
he was practically a primary debtor, quoted the sections covering en-
dorsement in the negotiable instruments act as applicable to non-
negotiable paper. Clearly, it was never intended by the framers of the
Act to make any rules controlling non-negotiable instruments whatever.
A strict adherence to the letter of the text will always justify a court
in declaring its decision and if this is unpopular the legislature may be
invoked to enact tle rule which the people demand. In the words of
88 App. Div. lO3.
"224 N. Y. 528; 121 N.E. 364, (1918).
'Allison v. Hollembeak, 138 Ia. 479, 114 N.W. io5g. (19o8).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Gates in Harris v. School District,' "We must construe the
law as we find it. It is no part of our duty to determine what it ought
to be."
Fourth, local conditions. Finally, to secure a uniformity of law there
must be uniformity of local conditions or in other words, for com-
mercial purposes, the Negotiable Instruments Act must adapt itself
harmoniously to the business conditions in all localities indiscriminately.
But, as Lord Coke once remarked, "the law must follow business."
This has been exemplified already in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
for some important changes have been made in the original draft and
others are contemplated. While this is the most serious obstacle to law
uniformity and will continue to be so, it is not fatal. Let us examine
some of these changes critically. By a provision of 'the Act, days of
grace are abolished. Grace originally became recognized before the age
of steam, when communication was slow and difficult. It is said to
have been a mere matter of indulgence at first, at the holder's election;
custom finally established it as a matter of right in favor of the party
who was primarily responsible for the payment of the paper. The
framers of the Act were governed by the principle that since the reason
for the rule ceased in these modern times the rule should cease also;
hence, the days of grace were abolished. Cutting off days of grace has
not been satisfactory to business interests and in several states three days
of grace have been granted sight drafts.19 Thus, the statute has been
modified because of local needs. Section 85 in its original draft, has
been materially changed in Arizona, Kentucky and Wisconsin by the
omission of the sentence "instruments falling due or becoming payable
on Saturday are to be presented for payment on the next succeeding
business day, except that instruments payable on demand may, at the
option of the holder, be presented for payment before twelve o'clock
noon on Saturday when that entire day is not a holiday." There is
probably more discord over this section than there is over any other
in the entire act. Section 87 also presents another apt illustration of a
rule which is not acceptable to many of the states.20 This section reads
"32 S. D. 544, 143 N.W. 898, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 267.
"States allowing days of grace are Mass., N. H., N. M., Okla., and R. I.
Colo. allows three days of grace on demand paper at the option of the holder,
N. C. allows days of grace on paper payable within the state, at sight in which
there is an expressed stipulation to that effect.
"This section omitted in the original draft of the Ill., Neb., and S. Dak.
Acts and has been repealed in Kan. and N. Dak. The Minn. Act, whether by
inadvertence or not, declares that the making of an instrument payable at a bank
shall not be equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the act of the
principal debtor. General statutes 1913, Section 5899.
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as follows: "Where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is
equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of
the principal debtor thereon." Prior to the statute there was some
conflict in the decisions as to the authority of a bank to pay a note or
accepted bill of exchange made payable there. No doubt the rule itself
is a most convenient one in practice, but, nevertheless, local conditions in
some states either entirely eliminated this rule or materially changed it.
It can easily be seen that even after the passage of the uniform act the
legislature may amend it materially, and each amendment detracts from
the uniformity desired. The commissioners on uniform laws of the
American Bar Association saw this danger and have advocated a remedy
which consists in placing before the commissioners of uniform state
laws the proposed amendment. If any proposed amendment is undesir-
able or unimportant all will agree that no legislature should adopt it.
On the other hand, if a suggested amendment is a desirable one it
should be adopted, not in one state only, but it should be adopted in
every state where the law is in force. It is useless to expect all these
states to adopt the same amendment precisely unless it comes from some
source as an authority to which all will defer. The commissioners on
uniform state law compose the only body in existence of that kind, and,
therefore, before any legislature adopts an amendment to the negotiable
instruments law it should obtain the opinion of this committee as to
the advisability of the proposed amendment. When thus approved the
committee should also recommend its adoption by the legislatures of all
the states that have adopted the law. Unless this is done the desired
uniformity cannot continue.
It has been argued by many that Article I of Section io of the Con-
stitution of the United States can be evoked to supply the remedy needed
against amendatory legislation by one state alone. Article I of Sec-
tion io makes the following declaration: "No state shall, without the
consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another
state"; the necessary implication being that with the consent of Congress
the states may enter into an agreement or compact with each other. The
states can therefore agree among themselves with the consent of Con-
gress that a uniform law adopted by them shall not be amended unless
an amendment proposed shall receive the approval of the commission
of the American Bar Association on Uniform State laws and shall be
adopted in all the states that have adopted the uniform law it is proposed
to amend. If amendments are to be lightly undertaken and adopted,
separately, without concurrent action in any one of the states that has
adopted a uniform law, uniformity is at once ended. The plan sug-
gested would prevent this, but the necessity for its course has not yet
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become manifest enough to arouse a public sentiment that would de-
mand it.
No agency, perhaps, plays a more important part in producing law
uniformity than the courts. It is a surprising fact that many courts
have interpreted and construed the various provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act without any reference to the Act at all. In the study
of a hundred cases taken at random the writer has found that forty
per cent of these cases have been decided by courts of last resort involv-
ing sections of the Act with no reference thereto whatsoever. It is to be
regretted that the Negotiable Instruments Act is not devoid of defects,
but the assistance of experience, the demands of business and the hearty
co-operation of the bench and bar will in time perfect the law of com-
mercial paper and give thereby an impetus to uniformity of law along
other lines.
The American Law Institute is at the present time engaged in a
monumental undertaking in the restatement of the principles of the com-
mon law. Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo says that there are those who
say that: "The bench and bar will find new subjects of contention in the
uncertainties which the restatement will develop, however well the work
is done. Now those who think and speak thus have missed altogether
the end and aim of our endeavor. They forget that the judicial proc-
ess .... is a technique that is founded upon the experience of judges
and not a technique that is founded upon the interpretation of authori-
tative texts. They fancy that we shall impose shackles when we seek
to loose and free. They fancy that we are building a new labyrinth in
which justice will be imprisoned when we are seeking to give a key to
the ancient labyrinth from which she has long cried to us for outlet
and escape." 21 Law uniformity will be greatly promoted through the
organized effort of the high minded and distinguished members of this
Institute. It will give us scientific statements that will lend the virtue
of stability and aid in the ultimate establishment of an American corpus
juris.
'Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute. 207.
